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Introduction
Question: The Causes and Effects of Incomplete
Contracting
1 How do procurement contract writers determine how complete a
contract to write?
2 How does that decision affect the other terms of the procurement?
Whether the contract is fixed-fee or cost-plus.
Whether the contract is fully competed.
The price paid.
The incidence of renegotiation.
3 Policy: What do these results imply about the current size of the
contracting workforce?
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Introduction
Illustration: Wartime Contracting
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Introduction
Illustration: Wartime Contracting
The agencies have failed to set and meet goals for competition and have
repeatedly
extended contracts and...increased ceilings on cost-type contracts and
modified task orders and contracts to add extensive new work
favored using delivery-order contracts like LOGCAP III over creating
more competitive and more targeted contract vehicles; and
used cost-reimbursable contract types even though simpler, fixed-price
contracts could expand the competitive pool.
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Introduction
Empirical Literature Focuses on Complexity as Driver of
Incompleteness
Auction/Neg: Rucker and Munn (Timber-2007), Bajari, Macmillan,
Tadelis (Construction-2008), Gil and Oudot (Movies and
Defense-2008)
FP/CP: Leffler and Rucker (Timber-1991), Kalnins and Mayer
(IT-2004), Crocker and Reynolds (Airforce Engines-1993), Corts and
Singh (Oil Drilling-2004)
Reneg: Guasch, Laffont, Straub (Concessions & Bureaucratic
Quality-2008)
Costs: Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis (Highway Procurement, 2010)
Our identification strategy is different. Answers are actually quite similar,
making us feel more comfortable about both.
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What Would We Predict?
Overview of a Model (Modified Bajari & Tadelis, 2001)
Basic idea: It’s costly to write more complete contracts, and even more
costly the busier you are. COs will optimally reduce the completeness of
their contracts as workload increases and adjust to these less complete
contracts in lots of ways.
More complete contracts make:
1 Renegotiation/Modification less likely (Unforseen contingencies are
rare)
2 Fixed-Price contracts more attractive (Since reneg. FP contracts is
more costly)
3 Competition more attractive (Since the cost on which firms bid are
more likely to matter)
4 Prices lower (That’s exactly the trade-off, time versus money)
Evidence for all this in the civilian context (Warren(2012)).
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Implementation
The Data
32 DoD contracting offices over 2005-2010 (9 Navy, 8 Army
(pre-2009), 8 Air Force, 7 Non-Branch)
Civilian CO Employment (GS-1102s), by experience.
Pct. Classified Budget, by branch/year
Every significant contract with:
Extent Competed (Full and Open, Exclusion, Single-Source)
Pricing Terms (Firm Fixed, Cost Plus Award, Time and Materials...)
Dollars Obligated (Initial or Change)
Award Type (Def. Contract, Delivery Order, and Purchase Order)
Modification Number and Reason
4-digit Product/Service Code and 6-digit NAICS of contractor
After dropping micro-purchases (under $25,000), about 6.9M
contractual actions, 2.3M of which are modifications.
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Implementation
Award Types- DC and DO for presentation
Original A new contract. Not a modification of some extant agreement.
Three types
Definitive Contract For a specified quantity. Not an order for
supplies/services placed against an established contract or with
Government sources or the creation of such a IDV. (EX:Non-Nuclear
Ship Repair, Communications Equipment, Ammunition)
Purchase Order A definitive contract that is for a small enough
(usually < $150k) to use simplified acquisitions procedures. (EX:
Electronic Modules, Recreational and Gymnastic Equipment, Valves)
Delivery Order A contract for supplies/services that does not specify
a firm quantity and that provides for issuance of orders for the
delivery of supplies/services during the period of the contract. (Ex:
Operation of Government-Owned Facility (Ammunition), Highway
Maintenance, Medical Supplies)
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Implementation
Measuring Workload in a Regression: Outcomes
Problem: If simple contracts take less time, and are easier to compete, an
agency with lots of simple contracts will have a large contracts/CO and a
high fraction competed.




(αjNjst) + δpst + κs ∗ yeart + εipst , (1)
Representative outcomes for contract i , in product/service class p, in
agency s, in fiscal year t:
Does this contract experience a substantive modification?
Is the contract Full-and-Open competed?
Is this a firm fixed-price contract?
How much is obligated on this contract (Log of Real 2009$)
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Implementation
Measuring Workload in a Regression: Employment




(αjNjst) + δpst + κs ∗ yeart + εipst , (2)
Log of employment of contracting officers in agency s in at the end of
fiscal year t.
Fraction of COs with 10-20 years, and 20+ years of experience.
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Implementation
Measuring Workload in a Regression: Work




(αjNjst) + δpst + κs ∗ yeart + εipst , (3)
Log of number of original contracts in each of 55 produce/service
classes. Ex: Chemical Products, ADP, Tools, Clothing.
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Implementation
Measuring Workload in a Regression: Fixed-Effects




(αjNjst) + δpst + κs ∗ yeart + εipst , (4)
3 sorts of Fixed Effects: office, year, product class.
Agency-specific time trends.
Note:
1 Intuitive Regression: Compare two years where an office has the
same mix of product/services but where the number of COs differ
from trend in different ways and see if the contractual provisions differ
from trend too.
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Implementation
Summary Stats- Definitive Contracts .38$T/1.45$T
Variable Price(16%) Firm Fixed Price
No Mod. Mod. No Mod. Mod.
Iraq or Af. 0 0.00168 0.118 0.0357
Full and Open Comp. 0.281 0.396 0.416 0.392
Excl. of Sources 0.410 0.434 0.278 0.231
Not Comp. 0.0571 0.117 0.204 0.168
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.809 2.808 0.365 2.439
(8.471) (40.61) (2.680) (34.82)
Final Oblig ($M2009) 1.066 14.90 0.390 4.883
(8.724) (188.9) (3.076) (51.60)
Modifications 0 4.806 0 3.438
(0) (29.47) (0) (6.393)
C. Officers 1105.2 1051.0 1346.9 940.6
(977.0) (913.6) (1024.8) (745.1)
n 6794 11306 57394 37665
pctmod 63 40
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Implementation
Summary Stats- Delivery Orders .79$T/1.45$T
Variable Price(16%) Firm Fixed Price
No Mod. Mod. No Mod. Mod.
Iraq or Af. 0.000367 0.00580 0.00329 0.00355
Full and Open Comp. 0.695 0.625 0.702 0.594
Excl. of Sources 0.162 0.145 0.161 0.227
Not Comp. 0.114 0.138 0.0955 0.110
Init Oblig ($M2009) 0.203 1.277 0.0920 0.728
(6.431) (16.05) (1.169) (8.833)
Final Oblig ($M2009) 0.225 3.168 0.0939 1.004
(6.508) (50.02) (1.201) (12.79)
Modifications 0 2.446 0 1.846
(0) (3.813) (0) (2.385)
C. Officers 1811.2 808.5 2090.4 1046.8
(1027.6) (773.5) (901.1) (829.9)
n 422k 77k 2.3M 241k
pctmod 15 9
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Implementation
Summary Stats- Iraq and Afghan (0.05$T)
Variable Price(1%) Firm Fixed Price
No Mod. Mod. No Mod. Mod.
Definitive 0 0.0409 0.163 0.290
Purch Order 0.00641 0.00430 0.656 0.525
Delivery 0.994 0.955 0.181 0.185
Full and Open Comp. 0.801 0.845 0.992 0.971
Excl. of Sources 0.128 0.0774 0.000960 0.00497
Not Comp. 0.0256 0.0624 0.00693 0.0186
Init Oblig ($M2009) 6.156 19.62 0.211 1.433
(16.30) (72.64) (2.754) (6.182)
Final Oblig ($M2009) 8.524 86.14 0.210 1.928
(33.29) (573.6) (3.080) (11.12)
Modifications 0 5.065 0 2.064
(0) (7.449) (0) (6.007)
n 156 465 42k 4631
pctmod/FFP 75 10
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Results
Renegotiation I- Substantive Changes (Pre-2009)
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel A: Any Substantive Modifications
C. Officers −0.39∗∗∗ −0.64∗∗
(0.11) (0.27)
C. Officers x IorA 0.09∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
Iraq or Af. −0.48 −0.95∗∗
(0.35) (0.39)
Pct. 10–20 −0.80∗∗∗ −1.13∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.23)
Pct. 20+ 0.39∗∗∗ −0.82
(0.15) (0.64)
n 89k 2.7M
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Results
Renegotiation II- Termination
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel B: Termination
C. Officers −0.08∗∗ −0.03∗
(0.04) (0.02)
C. Officers x IorA 0.03∗ 0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Iraq or Af. −0.11 −0.05
(0.08) (0.05)
Pct. 10–20 0.14∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.01)
Pct. 20+ −0.10∗ −0.09∗
(0.06) (0.05)
n 89k 2.7M
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Results
Renegotiation III- Number of Changes
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel C: Number of Substantive Modifications
C. Officers −2.16∗∗∗ −1.17∗∗
(0.21) (0.53)
C. Officers x IorA 0.16∗ 0.14
(0.09) (0.11)
Iraq or Af. −0.88 −0.71
(0.59) (0.74)
Pct. 10–20 0.51 −0.78∗∗∗
(0.65) (0.31)
Pct. 20+ 1.89∗∗∗ −1.86
(0.25) (1.31)
n 89k 2.7M
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Results
Workload and Renegotiation
Consistent effects of workload on modification and termination in
expected direction.
No major differences for I/A on marginal effects, but may weaken
estimates slightly.
Experienced COs have similar effects, except for # of mods in
definitive contracts.
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Results
Measures of Competition I: Full and Open Competition
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel A: Full and Open Competition
C. Officers 0.37∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.04)
C. Officers x IorA 0.11∗∗ 0.02
(0.05) (0.06)
Iraq or Af. −0.37 0.18
(0.34) (0.43)
Pct. 10–20 0.32 0.18∗
(0.40) (0.10)
Pct. 20+ −0.01 0.15∗
(0.35) (0.08)
n 113k 3.03M
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Results
Measures of Competition II: Exclusion of Bidders
In the data, most exclusions take the form of limiting the bidders to
specialized groups– Small Businesses, Veteran-Owned Firms,
Minority-Owned Firms, etc.
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel B: Competition with Exclusion
C. Officers −0.13 −0.09∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.03)
C. Officers x IorA −0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.02)
Iraq or Af. −0.04 −0.33∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.13)
Pct. 10–20 −0.59 −0.31∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.08)
Pct. 20+ 0.07 −0.05
(0.33) (0.06)
n 113k 3.03M
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Results
Measures of Competition III: Not Competed
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel C: Not Competed
C. Officers −0.18∗∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.08) (0.04)
C. Officers x IorA −0.06 −0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
Iraq or Af. 0.37 0.36
(0.35) (0.37)
Pct. 10–20 −0.04 0.16∗∗
(0.17) (0.08)
Pct. 20+ 0.03 −0.12∗
(0.17) (0.07)
n 113k 3.03M
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Results
Workload and Competition
Busier COs decrease use of Full-and-Open Competition and instead
limit the universe of firms who can participate or close competition.
Effect may be stronger in Iraq/Afghanistan
Effect of more experienced COs seems to be similar to effect of more
COs.
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Results
Contract Pricing
Def. Contract Del. Order
Use of Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts
C. Officers −0.19∗∗ −0.16
(0.09) (0.13)
C. Officers x IorA 0.04 −0.16∗∗
(0.04) (0.08)
Iraq or Af. −0.29 1.02∗∗
(0.27) (0.51)
Pct. 10–20 −0.02 −0.33
(0.14) (0.33)
Pct. 20+ −0.05 −0.46
(0.14) (0.29)
n 113k 3.03M
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Results
Workload and Pricing
Busier COs DECREASE the use of Firm-Fixed-Price contracts.
Very strong for Iraq/Afghan delivery orders.
Inconsistent with our model- something else must be going on.
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Results
Obligations I: Initial Obligation
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel A: Initial Dollars Obligated
C. Officers −0.65∗∗∗ −0.12
(0.24) (0.17)
C. Officers x IorA 0.17 0.41∗
(0.17) (0.24)
Iraq or Af. 0.24 −0.64
(1.13) (1.61)
Pct. 10–20 −1.42∗∗ −0.61
(0.67) (0.80)
Pct. 20+ 0.11 −0.76
(0.53) (0.65)
n 113k 3.03M
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Results
Obligations II: Total Obligation (so far)
Def. Contract Del. Order
Panel B: Total Dollars Obligated
C. Officers −0.55∗∗ 0.06
(0.26) (0.18)
C. Officers x IorA 0.07 0.43
(0.21) (0.27)
Iraq or Af. 0.58 −0.75
(1.40) (1.82)
Pct. 10–20 −1.03 0.16
(0.74) (0.81)
Pct. 20+ −0.09 −0.26
(0.62) (0.65)
n 113k 3.03M
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Results
Workload and Obligations
Busier contracting officers obligate more on definitive contracts, both
at first and overall.
Effect is slightly weaker in Iraq and Afghanistan
Weak evidence that busier contracting officers actually obligated more
on delivery orders in Iraq/Afghanistan.
Inconsistent with our model- something else must be going on.
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Results
Workload and Award Type
Def. Contract Del. Order
C. Officers 0.18∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗
(0.06) (0.06)
C. Officers x IorA −0.04∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.05)
Iraq or Af. 0.32∗∗∗ −0.94∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.33)
Pct. 10–20 −0.19 0.01
(0.14) (0.20)
Pct. 20+ −0.04 −0.09
(0.09) (0.13)
n 113k 3.03M
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Results
Workload and Award Type
Busier COs use more delivery orders and fewer definitive contracts.
Not true for contracts in Iraq/Afghan, where there is little evidence of
substitution.
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Results
Summary
Agencies that have a higher workload have more renegotiations, use
less competitive acquisitions procedures, use fewer definitive
contracts, and obligate more money. The also seem to use more
fixed-price contracts.
With the exception of the substitution to FP, these patterns are
consistent with a model of endogenously incomplete contracts, in
which the marginal cost of writing more complete contracts increases
in workload.
They are also consistent with a broad constellation of papers that use
a different source of variation in the degree of
incompleteness-complexity.
Model seems to work better for definitive contracts, but contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan do not seem especially subject to these workload
effects.
Possible savings by increasing the acquisitions workforce.
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